Inaudible sounds used to fingerprint browsers catch AliExpress red-handed
AliExpress was found using an outdated audio oscillator fingerprinting technique that measures browser audio processing differences via inaudible sawtooth waves The technique was accidentally discovered by researcher Matthew Callaghan when it interfered with his multipoint Bluetooth headphones Firefox (version 118+) and Chrome have already patched this vulnerability by using constant math libraries instead of OS-provided ones AliExpress employs over a dozen other fingerprinting methods including
Analysis
TL;DR
- AliExpress was found using an outdated audio oscillator fingerprinting technique that measures browser audio processing differences via inaudible sawtooth waves
- The technique was accidentally discovered by researcher Matthew Callaghan when it interfered with his multipoint Bluetooth headphones
- Firefox (version 118+) and Chrome have already patched this vulnerability by using constant math libraries instead of OS-provided ones
- AliExpress employs over a dozen other fingerprinting methods including canvas rendering, WebGL, WebRTC, and device motion tracking
Why It Matters
This case demonstrates how legacy tracking code persists on major e-commerce platforms long after browser vendors have neutralized specific techniques, highlighting the ongoing arms race between privacy protections and fingerprinting methods. It also shows that even obsolete techniques can still function on browsers that haven't implemented fixes, making it relevant for anyone concerned about web privacy or developing anti-fingerprinting tools.
Technical Details
- Audio oscillator technique: Two obfuscated scripts use the WebAudio API to generate a known sawtooth waveform at zero gain (inaudible), then measure how the browser's audio implementation alters the signal through an analyzer node, extracting frequency data that varies based on underlying math libraries
- Entropy source: Variability in OS-shipped math libraries combined with different CPUs historically produced unique signatures; Firefox countered this in version 118 (2023) by using its own constant math libraries, reducing entropy sufficiently to break the technique
- Additional fingerprinting metrics: Canvas rendering with toDataURL(), WebGL renderer/extensions/shader precision, screen/viewport dimensions, device pixel ratio, hardware concurrency, device memory, installed plugins, audio/video format support, WebRTC behavior, performance timing, mouse/touch/focus/scroll events, device motion/orientation, and browser automation detection properties
- Browser status: Chrome and Safari are likely unaffected due to shipping their own libraries; Firefox users on version 118+ are protected against this specific technique
Industry Insight
- Website operators relying on fingerprinting should audit their codebases for legacy techniques that may be ineffective on modern browsers while still collecting data, creating false confidence in tracking capabilities
- Browser vendors should continue proactive hardening of the WebAudio API and similar surfaces, as the AliExpress case shows that even deprecated techniques remain deployed at scale across the web
- Privacy researchers and practitioners should treat the AliExpress fingerprinting suite as a representative sample of industry-wide tracking practices, with thousands of sites likely employing similar multi-vector approaches
Disclaimer: The above content is generated by AI and is for reference only.