VAM Agreements Set to Be Regulated at Policy Level, with Institutional Competitiveness Returning to Value Discovery “对赌协议”即将迎来政策层面规范，机构竞争力将回归价值发现本身

The valuation adjustment mechanism (VAM), once hailed as the "invisible constitution" of China's primary market, has now been placed under the regulatory scalpel. On June 5, a "Guiding Opinion" issued by the General Office of the State Council tossed a moderately sized stone into the pond, yet the ripples it stirred were enough to send a shiver down the spines of institutions long accustomed to sprinting through gray areas. For the first time, the policy has explicitly signaled its intent to "operate on" VAMs—a clear message that the era in which entrepreneurs were suffocated by capital agreements and institutions built firewalls through contractual clauses is finally drawing to a close.

Look at the state of today’s VAM agreements—they have long strayed from their original purpose as a straightforward tool to "motivate entrepreneurs to achieve targets." Instead, they have mutated into a universal plaster for shifting risk. Investment firms shout about "investing in people, investing in the future" while stuffing performance targets, IPO deadlines, and even absurd clauses like "founder divorce clauses" into their contracts. It’s as if a deal isn’t "rigorous" unless the founder’s personal assets are exposed to unlimited liability, pushed to the very edge of the cliff. This trend has turned investment into the sale of financial products, reducing entrepreneurs to "VAM slaves" working solely for capital. A healthy primary market should not be built on extreme exploitation of entrepreneurs or crude carving up of risk.

Even more ironic is that the prevalence of this approach lays bare the hollowing out of capabilities among some investment firms. When skills like industry insight and value-added support are lacking, a bulletproof VAM becomes the easiest form of "risk control." Post-investment management? Unnecessary, since the VAM clauses have it covered. Value discovery? Too much trouble—better to gamble on short-term financial metrics. Over time, professional investment has devolved into "clause rent-seeking." Some firms’ core competitiveness has shockingly become the "legal team that writes the toughest VAM clauses." Isn’t that a tragedy for the industry?

Regulatory intervention now might seem like pouring cold water on the market, but in reality, it is redrawing the lines on a marathon course that has veered off track. The goal is not to eliminate VAMs—within reasonable bounds, they are indeed useful tools for balancing information asymmetry and clarifying rights and responsibilities—but to drag them from the "private domain of wild growth" into the "public domain with clear rules." This means that blatantly unfair "tyrant clauses" may be deemed invalid in future judicial practice, and liability will increasingly be judged based on commercial rationality rather than strict contractual wording. The scales of justice will tilt more toward protecting entities that genuinely create value, rather than capital that merely excels at drafting documents.

Once the shortcut of "relying on harsh clauses to hedge bets" is blocked, institutions will have no choice but to return to the real arena of competition. Future success will hinge on the depth of industry insight, the quality of post-investment value-added services, and the ability to truly identify and support entrepreneurs through market cycles. This will flush out the excess among "clause speculators," but for genuinely capable institutions and the long-term health of the market overall, this "bitter medicine" is administered at just the right time. Market evolution often begins by closing off shortcuts that rely on brute-force simplicity.

对赌协议，这个中国一级市场的“隐形宪法”，终于被摆上了监管的手术台。6月5日，一份国务院办公厅的《指导意见》扔下了一颗不大不小的石子，但激起的涟漪，足以让那些习惯了在灰色地带狂奔的机构心头一紧。政策首次明确要对“对赌”动刀，信号再清晰不过：那个创业者被资本协议压得喘不过气、机构用条款筑起防火墙的草莽时代，该收场了。

看看现在市面上的对赌协议都成了什么样子？早已不是最初那个“激励创业者达成目标”的朴素工具。它异化成了风险转嫁的万能膏药。投资机构一边高喊“投人投未来”，一边在协议里塞进业绩对赌、上市对赌、甚至“创始人离婚对赌”这种匪夷所思的条款。仿佛不把创始人逼到个人资产无限连带的悬崖边，就不是一笔“严谨”的投资。这种风气下，投资变成了卖理财产品，创业者则成了给资本打工的“对赌奴隶”。一个健康的一级市场，不应该建立在对创业者的极限压榨和对风险的粗暴切割之上。

更讽刺的是，这套玩法的盛行，恰恰暴露了部分投资机构能力的空心化。当行业洞察、产业赋能这些“硬功夫”修炼不足时，拿一份严苛到滴水不漏的对赌协议就成了最省事的“风控”。投后管理？不需要，反正有对赌条款兜底。价值发现？太麻烦，不如赌一个短期财务数据。久而久之，专业投资退化成了“条款寻租”。一些机构的核心竞争力，竟然变成了“写出最狠对赌条款的法务团队”。这难道不是一种行业的悲哀？

监管此时出手，看似是给市场“泼冷水”，实则是给已经有点跑偏的马拉松赛道重新划线。核心目的不是消灭对赌——对赌在合理范围内本就是平衡信息不对称、明确权责的有益工具——而是将其从“野蛮生长的私域”拉入“规则明晰的公域”。这意味着，未来那些显失公平的“霸王条款”可能在司法实践中被认定为无效；违约责任的追究，将更多地依据商业理性而非单纯的合同文字。法律的天平，将更倾向于保护那些真正在创造价值的实体，而非仅仅擅长起草文件的资本。

当“靠严苛条款保底”的快捷方式被堵上，机构们才不得不回归真正的竞技场。未来的竞争，将是产业认知深度的竞争，是投后增值服务的竞争，是真正识别并陪伴企业家穿越周期能力的竞争。这会挤掉一批“条款投机者”的水分，但对真正有实力的机构和整个市场的长期健康而言，这剂“苦口良药”，下得正是时候。市场的进化，往往始于对简单粗暴路径的封堵。